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wisely designed and implemented, the second form could be 
reasonably recast in terms of interest rather than ability.
Current writers who oppose tracking (both forms) make a 
powerful argument, and it is almost frightening to suggest that they 
may be mistaken (Nieto, 1999; Oakes, 1995; Spring, 2000). I argue that 
the idea of providing different programs (or tracks) for different talents 
and interests is a good one, fully compatible with social justice. It is the 
implementation of the idea that has gone badly wrong. I agree 
wholeheartedly with the opponents of tracking who claim that poor 
and minority students have been shoved into dead-end courses and, 
thus, deprived of anything close to equal opportunity. But different 
programs need not differ in quality, and forcing everyone—regardless 
of interest or talent—into one program is hardly democratic.
The concern that I want to explore in some depth was well 
expressed early in the twentieth century by Charles Eliot, when he 
was president of Harvard. He warned:
If democracy means to try to make all children equal or all men equal, 
it means to fight nature, and in that fight democracy is sure to be 
defeated. There is no such thing among men as equality of nature, of 
capacity for training, or of intellectual power. (National Society for the 
Promotion of Industrial Education, 1908, p. 13)
The point that I want to emphasize builds on Eliot’s comment 
that “democracy is sure to be defeated.” The comment is 
Should all children go to college? There are those who insist that the current dedication to preparing all students for college is inspired by democratic ideals. I 
will argue here that such a move actually puts our democracy at 
risk. We risk losing what might be called the Whitmanesque vision 
of democracy—a democracy that respects every form of honest 
work, includes people from every economic and social class, and 
cultivates a deep understanding of interdependence.
Conflicting Views on Democracy and Education
One view, made popular by Mortimer Adler, holds that democracy 
requires equal education for all children through high school, and 
by equal Adler meant the same. He wrote:
We should have a one-track system of schooling, not a system with two 
or more tracks, only one of which goes straight ahead while the others 
shunt the young off onto sidetracks not headed toward the goals our 
society opens for all (1982, p. 5).
Adler’s objections to tracking have been echoed by many 
educational researchers and writers today, although some— 
perhaps most—do not advocate the specific one-track curriculum 
he prescribed. In the discussion that follows it will be important to 
distinguish between two senses of tracks and tracking. In one sense, 
when we talk about tracks, we refer to different programs such as 
academic (or college preparatory), vocational/industrial, and 
commercial. I will offer a strong defense for this form of tracking. 
In a second sense, we refer to the practice of assigning students to 
classes composed by ability groups. I won’t say much about this 
form of tracking here, but I will suggest that, if the first form were 
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particularly interesting because Eliot’s defense of different tracks 
and electives represented a sharp turnaround from his earlier 
advocacy of the classical education recommended by the 
Committee of Ten (which he had chaired). During the period from 
about 1890 to 1910, there were strong voices urging that high school 
education be extended to all children. This seemed necessary to 
many for two reasons: first, the enormous influx of immigrants 
created a need for increased citizenship education and second, the 
nation was moving away from an agricultural economy toward one 
based on industry. To produce good citizens and workers the 
country needed to expand education. But there were equally strong 
voices warning that many children were simply not capable of the 
academic work that defined high schools—classical academies—of 
the time.
Both groups were right. Democracy demanded the extension 
of secondary schooling to all children and most children were at 
that time incapable or uninterested in the traditional secondary 
education. What was to be done? The answer was ingenious: the 
comprehensive high school was created. The public was persuaded 
that this new school would offer useful courses that would help 
graduates to get jobs in the new industrial society and not just 
studies for future professors, preachers, and enlightened house-
wives. The comprehensive high school, denigrated by traditional-
ists then and now, made American education a model for the 
world. High school education grew rapidly. By 1970, the high 
school graduation rate had climbed to more than 75% from its 1900 
mark of 6%. This was a remarkable achievement.
Complaints against the comprehensive high school never 
disappeared, but they were stronger in some years than others. In 
the period following World War II, the objections raised against 
progressive education (and the comprehensive high school) 
reached a high point. Echoing the Committee of Ten, Arthur 
Bestor claimed that all students should follow the sort of program 
laid down by the Committee, and he made his recommendations 
with reference to the demands of democracy. He vigorously denied 
that intellectual capacity was somehow lacking or diminished at 
lower economic levels (Angus & Mirel, 1999; Kliebard, 1995). The 
purpose of the school, he insisted, was to promote intellectual 
growth. Everything else should be subordinated to this goal. As we 
have noted, Mortimer Adler argued anew for the same claim thirty 
years later.
Without denying that intellectual growth is an important aim 
of education, we might respond to Bestor and Adler that other 
aims are equally important and that the achievement of intellectual 
goals is closely related to—perhaps even dependent on—the 
achievement of these other aims. Further, we might object to 
defining intellectual content as Bestor and Adler did—as a set of 
traditionally defined subjects long thought to be central to college 
preparation. Notice that we may agree with Bestor and today’s 
opponents of tracking that intellectual capacity is not confined to 
one socioeconomic group, race, ethnicity, or gender, but still insist 
that talents and interests differ across individuals. And we might 
also insist that the intellectual should not be narrowly defined in 
terms of traditional subjects such as algebra or history. So much 
hinges on this that we must address it directly if briefly.
Confusion Over the Intellectual
John Dewey made it clear repeatedly that no subject is inherently 
more intellectual than another (1916), and I have also made that 
argument in several places (Noddings, 1992, 2003, 2007). If we 
identify the intellectual with thinking, the algebra taught in 
schools is not inherently more intellectual than cooking or 
motorcycle repair. Calvin Woodward made the argument even 
before Dewey, referring to young workers in a forging-shop as 
“young Vulcans, bare-armed, leather-aproned with many a drop 
of an honest sweat . . . They are using their brains and hands” 
(Kliebard, 1999).
Today, Mike Rose has reminded us that thinking and doing 
are mutually supportive, tightly connected activities. No useful 
activity or preparation for an occupation involving hands-on work 
need be simply manual labor; such work can be taught and learned 
intelligently, and classroom discussion can move beyond specific 
doings to matters of citizenship, mutual respect, and prospects for 
a satisfying personal life (Rose, 1995, 2005). Rose connected his 
discussion to the meaning of democracy and the centrality of 
respect in a growing, evolving democracy. In such a democracy—
we might call it Whitmanesque —honest workers are worthy of 
respect. One should not need a college degree to earn respect 
(Dewey, 1927, p. 184).
We should note, however, that Rose has recently expressed 
concern that his appreciative appraisal of the mind at work might 
be used to launch a renewed effort to direct minority and low-SES 
students away from college preparatory courses and into voca-
tional programs. I share that concern, and I’ll say more about it a 
bit later. But I have an even greater concern and that centers on the 
high school dropout rate. We may comfort ourselves by bragging 
that we now prepare all students for college, but we lose a huge 
number before high school graduation. Keep in mind also that my 
enthusiasm for vocational education rests on two essential 
premises: first, that we will get to work seriously in creating rich 
and relevant vocational programs and, second, that we will provide 
extensive counseling and mentoring services so that students can 
make intelligent choices of program. If those premises are denied 
or ignored, I might unhappily join my antitracking colleagues and 
do my best to stuff algebra into everyone. Well, no, as an old math 
teacher, I probably couldn’t go that far. But I would roll up my 
sleeves and work with enlightened math educators to create a 
college-acceptable substitute for traditional algebra (Hersh & 
John-Steiner, 2011; Jacobs, 1970).
Whatever we devise by way of courses and programs, our 
products should be intellectually rich, and we should make it clear 
that the truly intellectual is closely related to the moral. In contrast 
to both those who identify the intellectual with some form of pure 
thinking and those who sharply separate the intellectual from the 
moral, Matthew Crawford insisted that the two are intimately 
connected:
Any discipline that deals with an authoritative, independent reality 
requires honesty and humility. I believe this is especially so of the 
stochastic arts that fix things, such as doctoring and wrenching, in 
which we are not the makers of the things we tend. (2009, p. 100)
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In describing the intellectual dimension of a good mechanic’s work, 
Crawford sees a set of virtues that connect that worker to the moral 
world of reality. The motorcycle mechanic must identify possible 
alternatives in his recommendations for repair, consider his client’s 
resources and the purposes for which the client intends to use the 
motorcycle, and report honestly on his analysis.
Miles Horton, too, in his work at Highlander School, saw the 
connection between the intellectual and the moral. Working, 
hiking, thinking, Horton struggled with the ideas of communism 
and socialism. He struggled with pacifism and its limits in advanc-
ing the good. He was clearly a well-read intellectual, but he built his 
life and work with working-class people and, like Paulo Freire, he 
believed that social justice must be achieved “with people from the 
bottom, who could change society from the bottom” (1998, p. 44).
It is worth mentioning also that the philosopher Charles 
Sanders Peirce claimed a moral base for intellectual-scientific 
work. A scientist must be dedicated to the truth if he or she is to 
find it, and science requires commitment to continued inquiry. 
Thus, genuine intellectual inquiry rests on a moral foundation. 
One does not shut out objections to one’s own position but renews 
inquiry in an attempt to resolve the problem and get at the truth 
(Thompson, 1963).
Some might argue that there are lines of work—in the 
financial world, for example—that do not seem to rest on a moral 
base and yet require vigorous mental activity. But, clearly, any work 
that has possible effects on the well-being of others has a moral 
dimension. We can recognize the mental acuity of financial wizards 
who betray or ignore the welfare of others, but we should hesitate to 
label their machinations as intellectual. Perhaps it is a matter of 
linguistic choice. Should we think of Professor Moriarity as a 
wicked intellectual or as a mental genius whose intellectual 
development was impaired?
In that spirit, we should admit that there are respectable 
thinkers who argue strongly that the intellectual is often rightly 
detached from the moral and even from empirical reality. The 
mathematician G. H. Hardy is said to have declared (bragged?), “I 
have never done anything ‘useful’” (Newman, 1956, p. 2026). Hardy 
(knowing that his proclaimed uselessness was nonsense in the eyes 
of the world) described himself as a maker of patterns composed of 
ideas. The patterns, he said, must be beautiful, and the significance 
of a mathematical theorem lies not in its practical consequences but 
in its beauty and seriousness. For Hardy, the intellectual cannot be 
identified with the trivial even if the trivial is called algebra. This 
reminds us that the intellectual has an aesthetic dimension. When 
there are no obvious real-world or human consequences of the 
work in question, judgment of its value focuses on its effects on the 
field of study and/or its beauty.
Some scientific work, separated from the empirical world, 
would pass both Peirce’s moral test (truth is scrupulously pursued) 
and Hardy’s aesthetic test (the results are beautiful and advance the 
field), but induce moral consternation when connected to the real 
world. Consider the moral agonies of Einstein, Oppenheimer, and 
other scientists involved in the development of the atomic bomb.
We should also recognize that intellectual work varies with 
respect to the objects it treats. Some intellectual work is done 
entirely with ideas and symbols; it does not require the body’s 
physical participation. Other intellectual work demands the 
cooperation of mind and body. Traditionally, we have made the 
mistake of thinking that only the first sort of activity is properly 
called intellectual. Far worse, however, we have wrongly supposed 
that any sort of activity done at a desk (or computer work station) is 
necessarily more intellectual than work done with the hands and 
body in motion. In fact, much white-collar work performed in 
cubicles is routine, sometimes mind-numbing (Crawford, 2009).
It is probably correct, however, that subjects, activities, and 
occupations offer a range of potential intellectual challenge. 
Usually, we consider as intellectuals those people who enter a field 
that requires devotion to thinking and working with ideas and 
symbols. Such work is not always directed at a specific, useful 
outcome. It involves a substantial amount of play, and it grants 
ardent participants considerable delight. Hardy was being honest 
(if incorrect) when he said that he had never done anything useful. 
As educators, we should help students to understand that intellec-
tual work (work with ideas) does indeed offer intrinsic rewards, but 
we need not elevate this work above all other forms of work that 
require varying participation of the intellect.
We must also admit that some jobs are essentially mindless 
and even demeaning. Digging ditches, cleaning toilets, scrubbing 
pots, picking beans all day, every day, are not jobs likely to engage 
the intellect. Utopian writers have long recognized the difficulty of 
reconciling economic justice and respect with the demeaning, 
boring nature of some necessary work. Writers as different as 
Edward Bellamy and B. F. Skinner have explored the idea of utopian 
societies in which such work is shared by everyone so that no one 
person need spend his or her full work week in hard, dirty, mind-
less labor (Bellamy, 1897/1960; Skinner, 1948/1962). Others have 
suggested that people who do this undesirable but necessary work 
should be paid correspondingly more for their sacrifice or that 
employers be compensated for hiring more low-wage workers 
(Phelps, 1997).
As we plan for the future of secondary schooling, we should 
abandon the notion that vocational and commercial education are 
intellectually inferior to traditional academic subjects. Some 
students—for a variety of reasons, all of which should be examined 
sympathetically—will land in the jobs no one would choose, but 
the outcome should not be an accepted result of what we provide in 
schools. Every course offered by our schools should be rich in 
intellectual, moral, and aesthetic content (Noddings, 2007).
Economic Concerns
Today, the most frequently heard argument for a single, traditional 
track does not emphasize the intellectual content, but I’ve spent 
some on it because it has been so important in the past and may be 
revived in the future. Instead, the main argument for preparing all 
students for college is economic. It is claimed that individuals who 
earn college degrees can expect higher lifetime earnings than those 
who do not, and that the nation needs more college graduates if it is 
to remain competitive in the world economy. The first claim is 
generally true, but there are many exceptions. Recent studies have 
shown that, given the high cost of college, it takes many years 
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before some graduates begin to show even a small edge in lifetime 
earnings, and some never do. On the second, it is not at all clear 
that increasing the number of college graduates will automatically 
increase our national competitiveness. Instead, we need to educate 
people well for the work they will do.
It is foolish to suppose that our economic competitiveness 
depends on the number of college graduates we produce. We have 
learned recently that China is suffering from an overload of college 
graduates, and many young Chinese are unable to find work 
commensurate with their education. It seems likely, too, that the 
lower rate of unemployment among college graduates in the 
United States is due at least in part to their acceptance of jobs that 
do not require a college education.
In many of the most prosperous European countries, high-
quality vocational education and training (VET) are deemed 
essential:
Countries with strong VET systems have a different conception about 
learning for jobs. They make a distinction between a calling or 
occupation and learning the specific skills needed to weld or solve 
banking problems or manage the IT system in a corporation . . . Work 
is related to active citizenship and thus education and training needed 
for work are seen as the joint responsibility of the government and 
what are called nicely the “social partners” (employers and labor 
unions). (Hoffman, 2010, p. 1)
American educators and policymakers should renew the conversa-
tion about “callings,” finding work that is satisfying in itself, and the 
connections among intellectual, moral, social, and aesthetic ideals.
In a recent letter to the editor, an angry man complained that 
he could no longer compare his income with professional workers. 
Now, he wrote, he could barely stay even with police and firemen. 
He ended his bitter comments with this question: Why did I go to 
college? Apparently, he saw only one reason for going to college—
to make more money—and he is not alone in this thinking. We 
encourage it in our schools today.
The present emphasis on preparing everyone for college may 
also have an entirely different sort of economic motivation; it 
may not be driven entirely by a mistaken democratic commit-
ment to social justice. Good vocational education is far more 
expensive than the usual college preparatory course of study. It 
requires more space, expensive equipment, smaller classes, a 
specially trained faculty, and a commitment to add new equip-
ment regularly. It is far less expensive to place all students in 
regular academic courses whether or not such placement suits 
them. Even if we provide extra help to assist students in passing 
these courses, we are still ignoring their present and long-term 
interests. We feel justified in claiming that we have provided 
equal opportunity when in fact we have hurt many students 
doubly: We have forced them into studies at which they do not do 
well, and we have deprived them of courses at which they might 
succeed. As a result, many do not graduate from high school, and 
even those who do may wind up in jobs by default instead of by 
choice. They may well believe that they are doing this work 
because they are not good enough for anything else.
Toward Democratic Equal Opportunity
It is reasonable to put aside claims that children are intellectually 
deprived if they do not receive a college preparatory education. 
On the contrary, we should recognize that many students today 
are indeed intellectually short-changed by the academic program 
forced on them. Many students suffer algebra courses that bear 
little resemblance to the algebra that might make it possible to 
study further mathematics. These unfortunate students—and 
their number seems to be increasing—have algebra listed on their 
transcripts, but they have learned so little that they must start all 
over in community college. It is not necessarily the case that their 
teachers are at fault. Indeed, many teachers present weak courses 
because they do not want their students to fail, and they know 
that the students would in fact fail more rigorous courses. Thus, 
they concentrate on teaching well-defined skills and facts—mate-
rial Whitehead (1929/1969) called “inert ideas”—and omit the 
material essential to understanding. The intellectual is washed 
out.
We are now at a point very like the one educators and policy-
makers faced in 1900. Should we prepare all children for college? 
Why? When a similar question was raised in 1900 about high 
school attendance, advocates had good answers to the question. 
How are we answering it? One answer (heard from our current 
president and at least one past president) is that we should be first 
in the world in the production of college graduates. Why? We 
should press this question and invite vigorous debate. For example, 
do we really need more scientists? At present, we hold many young 
PhDs in near servitude for years because there is no room for them 
in either the academic or the industrial hierarchy. The frequently 
voiced intention to be number one has become a peculiar 
American mania. We would do better to concentrate on the quality 
of our graduates at every level.
I think we should respond to the current question in much 
the same way that Eliot and others argued in the early 20th 
century. They endorsed secondary education, but they redefined 
it. I am not arguing against postsecondary education—only 
against defining it in terms of a traditional college education. 
Further, those who can profit from postsecondary education must 
first complete secondary education, and many more might do so 
if they were given an opportunity to study material relevant to 
their interests and talents. Schools today claim to offer equal 
opportunity by forcing all students, regardless of interests, into 
the same curriculum. This does not meet a democratic criterion 
for equal opportunity. In a genuine democracy, choice is funda-
mental, and democratic education should provide opportunities 
for intelligent, guided choice.
Some thoughtful critics of the approach I suggest object that 
teenagers are too young to make decisions that may affect their 
futures dramatically. However, I am not suggesting that young 
students be allowed to do as they please without guidance. And, 
in agreement with colleagues who wish to end tracking, I am 
opposed to assigning youngsters to tracks. The choice must be 
made collaboratively: counselors sharing what is revealed by 
tests, grades, former teachers’ comments, and records; students 
sharing their hopes and dreams for the future. By counselors here 
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I mean teachers, parents, and community mentors, as well as 
professional counselors; such counseling should begin early and 
be continuous. Moreover, if a student insists on enrolling in the 
college-preparatory program despite a poor prognosis, he or she 
should be allowed to do so. Every effort should be made to find a 
program suited to the student’s talents, interests, and willingness 
to persevere. John Dewey spoke on the need for this forward-
looking, reflective process:
To find out what one is fitted to do and to secure an opportunity to do 
it is the key to happiness. Nothing is more tragic than failure to 
discover one’s true business in life, or to find that one has drifted or 
been forced by circumstances into an uncongenial calling. (1916, p. 308)
A choice made at the level of high school should, of 
course, be reversible. These days, middle-aged workers often 
change their professions, and teenagers should certainly be 
supported in doing so. We should rethink the idea that all high 
school students must graduate in four years. The point is not 
simply to go straight forward to a better-paying job but, more 
important, to find work with which one can feel productive 
and reasonably content.
Charles Eliot feared that democracy would be the loser if 
we insisted on forcing all students into the same college-prepa-
ratory curriculum. He was right. By doing this, we ensure that 
either the courses will become weaker or many children will fail 
them. This is not because many children are incapable of good 
thinking or because teachers have low expectations for them. 
People are different, and we all do our best thinking in areas that 
interest us. Intellectual challenges can be introduced into any 
well-taught subject. Instead of working toward creating rich, 
relevant, and intellectually challenging courses in every pro-
gram, we have endorsed the notion that a subject is automati-
cally intellectually rich if it has regularly appeared in the 
traditional curriculum. When children do poorly with that 
curriculum, they may feel like failures, and when they fall into 
occupations by default, they may believe it is because they were 
not good enough for something better. That is the risk to 
democracy we invite by insisting that equal opportunity means 
the same curriculum for all.
John Gardner put it clearly in Excellence. He too extolled the 
value of continued education, but he argued that this “does not 
mean sending everyone to college” (1961, p. 97):
But scaling down of our emphasis on college education is only part of 
the answer. Another important part of the answer must be a greatly 
increased emphasis upon individual differences, upon many kinds of 
talent, upon the immensely varied ways in which individual 
potentialities may be realized. (1961, p. 99)
Schooling consonant with genuine democracy not only 
recognizes differences. It respects and appreciates those differences. 
Walt Whitman saw all this clearly. In his beautiful “Song for 
Occupations,” he expressed admiration and even awe at the 
enormous variety of work being done around him. In lines ringing 
with a celebration of “ordinary” people, he wrote, “the sum of all 
known value and respect I add up in you whoever you are,” and 
then after praising old institutions, the Union, and the 
Constitution, he wrote:
I do not say they are not grand and good—for they are,
I am this day just as much in love with them as you,
But I am eternally in love with you and with all my fellows upon the 
earth. (1982, p. 93)
Whitman reminds us here that democracy is not entirely defined 
by principles and processes. It is fundamentally, as Dewey said, a 
mode of associated living (1916, p. 87).
As we think about shaping our schools to promote genuine 
democracy, we might consider vocational schools similar to those 
in Germany and the Scandinavian countries. They have been highly 
effective, but there are two possible drawbacks to this arrangement: 
One is the practice of assigning students to these programs instead 
of allowing guided choice as I’ve suggested here. Another is that 
placing young people in separate buildings, often miles apart, 
undermines the possibility of making the school-place into a living 
democracy. Democracy is more than a set of practices, as Dewey 
and Whitman pointed out. The very best, small comprehensive 
high schools in 20th-century America provided real opportunities 
for students from different programs to act together in music, art, 
clubs, athletics, and student government. It is probably impractical 
to build and maintain such schools today. We can get ideas from 
many times and places, however, without trying to reproduce 
exactly what others have done. The road forward is rarely behind 
us. The question for us is how to create schools that will serve as 
incubators of democracy.
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